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Abstract: This inquiry seeks to establish that Karl Marx and Pierre-Joseph
Proudhon espoused fundamentally different visions of socialism. Marx
regarded Proudhon with initial enthusiasm and joined the left at large in
celebrating his 1840 essay, What is Property? However, in 1846, when
Proudhon attempted to solve the problems of capitalism in his work,
System of Economic of Contradictions or The Philosophy of Poverty, Marx
took to his pen for an unsparing attack, authoring his The Poverty of
Philosophy. At the crux of their split were two analyses of the status of labor
and two competing prescriptions for change. While Proudhon wished to
align property rights and access to means of production in favor of laborers
in a decentralized fashion, Marx saw the need for a radical political change
along with the abolition of property and the market system. The differences
in the two visions have echoed in the debates over socialism ever since.
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This inquiry seeks to establish that Karl Marx and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon
espoused fundamentally different visions of socialism. The two men worked
tirelessly in their respective quests to pave a way out of the capitalist
system, a system that they both understood to be a source of mass poverty
production. Yet their worldviews, along with their chosen approaches to
creating change, diverged dramatically. Proudhon sought peace, harmony,
and equilibrium, and believed in justice and reason as all-powerful
principles. He wanted individual freedom and attempted to develop forms
of commodity production that did away with exploitation and gave workers
power over the operations. Marx, on the other hand, saw conflict as
inevitable given the class antagonisms inherent in capitalism, and believed
there was no possibility for the reconciliation of proletarian interests within
the existing system. For him, nothing less than political revolution would
suffice.

Foundations of analysis
To understand the two diverging viewpoints, and why their
differences would become irreconcilable, it is helpful to understand that the
two men were born to very different circumstances. Proudhon was born in
1809 in a Burgundy suburb. With his father a cooper, his mother a cook,
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the family was to remain poor. Proudhon’s education came from a nearby
parish, and to contribute financially, he also did farm work at a young age
and entered a printing apprenticeship. D.W. Brogan (1934, 10), in his
biography, notes that Proudhon felt pride in his “free peasant” roots.
Proudhon, while rejecting organized religion, named the Bible as one of his
main influences. His trade work also exerted an influence on his vision for
the world, grounding it in a belief in the wealth producing potential of
labor. He spent his life, always in France, pursuing various enterprises
alongside his writing. He made various investments; he operated a printing
press; he worked in his father’s trade as a cooper at times; he started a bank
called “The People’s Bank” along the lines of his philosophy, believing free
credit to be a powerful tool to the economic liberation of the proletarian
classes. Through run-ins with censorship and imprisonment, he continued
to put out his critiques of society while finding one way or another to make
a living for his family.
Marx, on the other hand, was born to the professional class. His
father was a lawyer who had painted over his Jewish roots in order better to
be accepted in German society. Born in 1818, he experienced the best
education Germany had to offer, learning at University of Berlin just after
the passing of the revered Georg Friedrich Hegel. His life work would be the
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development of his economic analysis along with the communist doctrine
that he saw as the inevitable conclusion of this analysis, which he extended
to work in building the International Communist League. After the death of
his father in 1841, poverty chronically plagued him. He moved around,
from Germany, to France, to Brussels, and finally to England, as the
political circumstances changed, barely eking out enough for his family to
survive, and depending on his friend and collaborator, Friedrich Engels, for
supplementary support.
Marx’s thinking developed as he assimilated the contributions of
various thinkers, as Isaiah Berlin [1960] (2013) describes in his biography.
From Hegel, Berlin (2013, 56) remarks, Marx absorbed dialectical thinking,
the perception of history unfolding in a series of antagonisms, the thesis,
the antithesis, and the synthesis, which would resolve the antagonism but
from which would emerge new contradictions. Upon reading the materialist
writings of Ludwig Andreas von Feuerbach, Berlin (2013, 70-1) notes, Marx
kept the dialectical model but discarded the idealism to which Hegel and
his followers attached it. Instead, he accepted Feuerbach’s proposal that
material conditions, rather than, as Hegel had it, spiritual underpinnings,
propelled the unfolding events of history.

3

To this foundational structure, Marx elaborated with the view that
struggle between economic classes was, in particular, the factor that drove
the course of history, an idea, Berlin (2013, 83) points out, developed by
Henri de Saint-Simon, who was one of a new type of liberal historians
writing at the turn of the 19th Century. Though an exhaustive list of Marx’s
intellectual influences is perhaps impossible, two other sources seem to be
central to the worldview he developed. First, as Berlin (2013, 174) points
out, it was the French Revolution writer François-Noël Babeuf, who
developed the idea of a dictatorship of the proletariat. This is the idea that
would set Marx distinctly, irreconcilably apart from the anarchists who had
sought to collaborate in the Communist league. This endorsement of
dictatorship, one suspects, also contributed to making Marx’s work
required literature in the most notorious, brutal dictatorships that would
develop in the 20th Century under the name of Communism, however far
they veered from Marx’s vision of a communist society.
Second—and more benignly, though just as importantly to the
intellectual content of Marx’s work—Berlin (2013, 14) notes that Marx
studied the classical economists, with Adam Smith and, above all, David
Ricardo, providing the inspiration and the preliminary workings-out of
Marx’s labor theory of value, upon which his analysis of the capitalist
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system and its exploitation in large part rested. His labor theory of value, so
assiduously worked out, would be an important source of clash with
Proudhon.
Berlin (2013, 75) notes that it was in Paris, where he arrived in 1843
and lived until 1845, that Marx came fully into the development of his
particular vision. It was here he met Proudhon, with whom he had
corresponded previously. The intellectual vibrancy and revolutionary fervor
were a great inspiration to Marx, though he took a critical stance even
towards those who would seem to be natural allies.
The two men had very different intellectual approaches. One can see
in Proudhon’s work passion and dreaminess, along with a reverence for the
ideals of justice and reason, features in common with the French literature
and culture that held a strong influence over him; in Marx, one witnesses
both the plunging intellectualism found in the German works that inspired
him, paired with the assiduous cataloguing of details in line with the
English writings he absorbed before arriving in the country where he was
eventually to live the last part of his life. Whereas Marx conscientiously
studied Ricardo and Smith, as well as a long list of political economists,
philosophers, and what he called the “vulgar” economists, the thinkers who
built the foundations of the neoclassical economics that is practiced widely
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today, Proudhon was fine with getting Hegel secondhand, with drawing
from a variety of thinkers while diverging from their exact ideas in pursuit
of his own, creative vision. He was certainly not illiterate; he read widely,
with particular attention to socialist thinkers such as Charles Fourier, but
he was not the painstaking scholar that Marx was.
Proudhon’s casual treatment of others’ ideas allowed him to develop
his own concepts in a creative way. As Henri de Lubac (1948, 152), in his
work on Proudhon’s life and thought, The un-Marxian Socialist, points out,
Proudhon, inspired by Hegel’s dialectic as well as Kant’s concept of
antinomy, developed a different, though similar model of development:
equilibrium, in which contradictions persist unresolved but find a gradual
balance. As opposed to Hegel’s progression of theses, antitheses, and
syntheses, de Lubac (1948, 155) notes that Proudhon believed that the same
antagonistic elements would never be negated but rather produce an
oscillation; the two opposing elements would not eliminate but moderate as
well as “exalt” each other. De Lubac (1948, 157) notes that Proudhon
proposed a reciprocity of pairs of elements: property and the State, order
and freedom, socialism and political economy. The concept of harmony,
which Proudhon, as de Lubac (1948, 157-8) notes, received from Fourier,
figured centrally into his vision. History would proceed towards harmony.
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Proudhon, in stark contrast to Marx, identified certain ideals as
foundational to human understanding as well as historical progress. Justice
and equality, for him, were determinative principles. In Proudhon’s eyes, as
de Lubac (1948, 278) notes, justice quite literally “governs the world” as
well as human understanding, leading towards harmonious equilibrium.
Marx’s severe faithfulness to his vision had the advantage of
producing one of the most in-depth analyses of society ever produced; it
had the disadvantage of producing a belief system as domineering as
religious doctrine (ironically, for a man who so loathed religion.)
Proudhon’s intellectual promiscuity had the advantage of permitting a
variety of ideas to live alongside one another, to allow for an openness of
thought; the disadvantage was perhaps that too many ideas could survive in
this intellectual atmosphere. Proudhon wrote against war, and then
accepted it as a necessity. He harbored a number of prejudices: he viewed
women as incapable of the self-directed lives he wished for men; he hated
the railroads and their assault on older industries. He engaged in faulty
philology, as Brogan (1934, 38) details, and used it as a basis of his
analyses.
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The Definitive Split:
The Philosophy of Poverty and Marx’s response
Marx initially praised Proudhon’s work. At the time Marx arrived in Paris,
Proudhon had gained international renown and a national following. His
socialist writings, Berlin (2013, 89) notes, were well known in France and
beyond. In particular, Berlin (2013, 104) notes, Marx had read and praised
Proudhon’s 1840 work, What is Property?, out of which comes Proudhon’s
most famous phrase, “What is Property? It’s theft.” Proudhon’s indictment
of property owners who received income while contributing nothing was in
line enough with the broad goals of the left for Marx to be an admirer. The
seeds of their divergence, however, were already planted. It was in What is
Property? that Proudhon identified himself as an “anarchist,” finding the
authority of government to be as wrong as the authority of capital. (His
“anarchism,” it should be noted, was a very moderate variety and distinct
from other anarchists, such as the contemporary Mikhail Bakunin, who
experienced his own falling out with Marx.)
It was not until 1846, however, that the two split definitively.
Proudhon published his work, System of Economic Contradictions, or The
Philosophy of Poverty, and submitted it to Marx for feedback. In this work,
Proudhon seeks to reconcile the antagonism between socialism and
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political economy, between the material gifts of the productive system due
to technology and the division of labor, on the one hand, and the
exploitative dynamics of capital-labor relations, on the other. He gives his
critique of the views offered by the orthodox economists such as J.B. Say
and the proposals of socialists, offering his own, somewhat spotty economic
analyses, covering the issues of tax, wages, competition, and technology.
Marx did not take kindly to Proudhon’s attempt to reconcile forces
that he saw as fundamentally inimical. In reply to Proudhon’s work, he
published The Poverty of Philosophy, A response to “The Philosophy of
Poverty” by M. Proudhon [1867], turning Proudhon’s title on its head. He
tore Proudhon’s analyses and proposed solutions to shreds. Marx attacked
Proudhon on two levels. First, he found Proudhon to be intellectually
deficient: he calls him a “sophist,” accusing him of allowing bold rhetoric to
cover up a basic lack of understanding of economic thought. Marx, with his
mastery of history and economic thought, cites at length Proudhon’s
intellectual predecessors, whose ideas, in Marx’s view, Proudhon has failed
to comprehend, erased by claiming for himself intellectual “discoveries,” or
which have preemptively invalidated Proudhon’s arguments. Beyond this,
however, Marx is levelling a more serious accusation. It is the one which he
repeats in The Communist Manifesto and throughout his works: that
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Proudhon’s is a petit bourgeois socialism, a veiled apology for the capitalist
system rather than a true challenge to it.
The first accusation may have some merit. De Lubac (1948, 23-4)
notes that even Proudhon himself admits to his own intellectual
flightiness—and, to be fair, any thinker facing a comparison to the rigor of a
behemoth like Marx is inclined to seem unserious. The accusation of
Proudhon’s intellectual deficiency is complicated, however, by the
possibility that Marx was simply disturbed by the fact that the successful
Proudhon, elder to Marx by nine years, was writing about the same topics
Marx planned to address—and coming to different conclusions. Brogan
(1938, 45-46) notes that Proudhon saw Marx’s response purely as a
manifestation of jealousy that he was first past the post on these topics, and
more successful. Brogan also notes, however, that there were fundamental
differences between the two both in aim and in method.
The aim of this inquiry is not to pronounce judgment on whether
Marx’s attack of the quality of Proudhon’s work is justified. Rather, our
focus is on Marx’s criticism of Proudhon’s essential positions. The task is
difficult, for these two levels of criticism cannot be entirely disentangled: it
was Proudhon’s errors, in Marx’s rendering, that led to the bourgeois
conclusions of his analysis. (Marx finds these bourgeois-friendly errors in
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many writings, in the classical economists, for instance.) We will examine
two concepts essential to the differences in Marx’s and Proudhon’s
economic thinking, the labor theory of value and the analysis of commodity
exchange. These two concepts are essential to the differences in Marx’s and
Proudhon’s economic thinking and, as we shall come to in the third part of
this inquiry, to the conclusions they came to about the correct methods of
producing change.
As Berlin (2013, 109) summarizes, Marx’s view was that Proudhon
had misunderstood Ricardo with regard to the labor theory of value. Where
Ricardo saw the theory that labor underlies exchange value as a
straightforward statement of the way things actually worked, Proudhon
believed, instead, that it was a solution: if labor truly became the basis of
exchange value, workers would be justly compensated. It was an error, in
Marx’s eyes, at the basis of many forms of socialism, and an error
responsible, in turn, for Proudhon’s misunderstanding of money,
commodity exchange, and the entire economic structure of capitalism.
Proudhon’s analysis of the status of labor within the economic system
is the central point of Marx’s critique on this subject. Proudhon (1972, 101),
accepting the view of Say and orthodox economists, states that labor is not
merchandise. When it is said to have value, there is a contraction of
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expression at work. (Here we see Proudhon’s philological flair.) The true
meaning of the expression is that labor’s product has a certain amount of
value.
Such an analysis is entirely at odds with that of Marx. As he would
develop extensively in Capital and other works, the commodification of
labor was a defining fact of the capitalist system. Labor was absolutely, and
quite literally, merchandise. Engels (1920, 27), in prefacing the The Poverty
of Philosophy, notes that Marx had not yet developed the terminological
distinction between labor and labor-power. However, Marx’s critique
already embodies this distinction. The value of labor—or rather, as it would
be identified later, the value of the labor-power commodity, was
determined by the amount of labor necessary to produce it, that is, to
produce the means of subsistence of the laborer. The formula for the value
of other commodities was analogous: the amount of labor necessary to
produce them determined their value. In Marx’s The Poverty of Philosophy
[1867] (1920), Marx (1920, 59) accused Proudhon of conflating the value of
labor (i.e., the value of labor-power) and the labor-determined relative
value of commodities. Furthermore, not to recognize labor as a commodity
was the ultimate in bourgeois thought—to pretend labor commodification
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was only an expression and not a brutal fact which forced laborers to sell
their only possession was to ignore the essence of capitalism.
In part, the dispute may come down to a deliberate semantic
difference in the two thinkers. When Proudhon “conflates” the value of
labor and the relative value of commodities, he is establishing his version of
just compensation: the value of labor was measured by its product, while
the value of products (commodities) was reciprocally measured by the labor
that produced them. For Proudhon, this theory of value led to a system of
just proportionality of compensation: the products of labor would be valued
in relation to one another according to the amount of labor that went into
them, and laborers would be compensated accordingly—so long as they
were not working under capitalists. The problem with the capitalist system,
for Proudhon, was the violation of this proportionality. Those who did not
work received compensation due to an unjust arrangement of rights and
resources.
For Marx, proportionality existed: but in the productive system of
advanced capitalism, the value of the labor commodity figured as
infinitesimal in relation to other commodities, because such a small
amount of labor was necessary to produce it, i.e., to produce the means of
subsistence of the laborer. Marx saw Proudhon’s value theory as circular:
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how could labor value be determined by its product and products be
determined by labor? The circularity is not fatal to Proudhon’s analysis if
one accepts that labor acts simply to provide proportionality of value to
commodities. However, Marx’s definition of labor as a commodity made
their two viewpoints irreconcilable.
Proudhon’s treatment of commodity production and exchange also
meets Marx’s total rejection. For Marx, Proudhon begins in error: His
analysis starts with two individuals, two “free” individuals. Proudhon erases
their embeddedness within systems to imagine them free. In Capital, Marx
(2011, 79) leaves a footnote concerning Proudhon, proposing that his
misunderstanding of relative value comes down to the fact that that
commodity production is the ultimate dream of the petit bourgeois, the
path to freedom and independence. To Marx, commodity production was
coextensive with capitalist production. Marx (1920, 84) denounces
individual exchange as inherently bourgeois, inherently composing and
composed of class antagonism.
Whereas Proudhon saw commodity exchange as serving to satisfy the
variety of human wants, Marx saw it as determining wants, determining
consumption by the law of what is cheapest to make and what, in
consequence, allows for the most surplus labor to be extracted. He (1920,
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67) poses the question of why cotton, potatoes, and spirits are produced far
more than their superior alternatives, linen, wheat, and beer. His answer is
that “in a society founded on poverty the poorest products have the fatal
prerogative of being used by the greatest number.” Circumstances of
production, for Marx, are always determinative of patterns of consumption.
Marx asserts that Proudhon’s assessment of prices is false, but beyond that,
Marx finds in Proudhon’s analysis a wishful way of seeing society, a
“bourgeois”-colored view, that the structure of society, in particular, its
practices of production, faithfully addresses the needs and desires of the
people. The result, Marx (1920, 68) claims, was that Proudhon, without
understanding society, wrote an apology for it.

Methods for Creating Change
From the two distinct analyses of the economic system came two very
different conclusions as to how to go about bringing positive change.
Proudhon, despite being a committed fighter for the left, came to symbolize
a certain form of impotent socialism in Marx’s eyes. In Marx’s 1848
Manifesto of the Communist Party (now known simply as the Communist
Manifesto), which was commissioned by the Communist League, as Berlin
(2013, 153) notes, to offer a definitive summary of the doctrines to which
Marx and his co-author, Friedrich Engel, ascribed, Marx identifies the
15

various deficient forms of socialism and communism, analyzing their faults.
There was “reactionary socialism,” practiced by classes that had survived
from the old, feudal order who looked still to the past for their salvation.
There was “conservative or bourgeois socialism,” which sought, rather than
true change, to cure the proletariat of their resentments while maintaining
the existing order. And there was “critical-utopian socialism and
communism,” offered by philosophers who had not yet seen capitalism in
its full-fledged form, which built fantasies rather than real world solutions.
Marx (2012, 98) identified The Philosophy of Poverty as epitomizing
the second type: conservative or bourgeois socialism. Again and again
throughout Marx’s works, Proudhon served as the archetype of the “petit
bourgeois” way of thinking, which accepted the basic foundations of the
capitalist system. In the view of Marx, as Berlin (2013, 93) notes,
Proudhon’s thinking was anything but revolutionary.
For Marx, as he (1920, 66) writes in The Poverty of Philosophy, it was
simple: “No antagonism, no progress.” Proudhon, on the other hand,
sought harmony. As de Lubac (1948, 32) notes, he even referred to himself
periodically, slightly in jest, as a Conservative. Marx wanted political
revolution, the abolition of property and class divisions, along with a
proletarian government that would distribute all social products according
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to need; Proudhon wanted to develop methods of economic empowerment
for workers, centered around the restructuring of property rights in favor of
labor, the availability of free credit, and the development of workers’
associations which would put the means of production into the hands of the
workers in a decentralized fashion.
Proudhon by no means stayed out of the fray of political life. Not only
did he stand for election and get elected (briefly) in the socialist party, he
went to prison for his revolutionary writings. Yet, despite his high
engagement in political life, Proudhon, as George Comninel (2015, 76) in
his essay, “Marx and the Politics of the First International,” puts well, took
a rather “anti-political stance.” Brogan (1934, 59) adds the point that for
Proudhon, government inherently functioned in the interests of those that
governed.
Instead of striving for political power, Proudhon sought to establish
new systems that would put property in the hands of those that put it to
productive ends—the workers. In spite of his most famous phrase that
“property is theft,” Proudhon did not wish to abolish property, but rather
align it with use: those who lived in a home were its rightful owners; those
who worked on a field were the field’s rightful owners. In pursuit of this
vision, he called for the availability of interest-free credit (and worked to
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establish his People’s Bank on this principle) along with the development of
associations between workers in order to control the means of production
collaboratively, an idea, inspired by Fourier, that went under the name
“mutualism”. He believed the market had great advantages in catering to
the diversity of human needs and wants, but in its current form it was
corrupted: the working class was entering into the market not quite freely
but under the fetters of the unjust property system.
Marx saw the market and all property as inherently engendering an
oppressive class system. He saw the answer in proletarian political power.
He agreed that government was for those who governed. At least, he
believed this when it came to the current system, but he believed all
interests would be united under the eventually classless communist regime.
The differences between the two visions came alive during meetings
of the International Workingmen’s Association, known as the First
International. It was in this organization, begun in 1864 by working class
men in England, that Marx, as Comninel (2014, 60) notes, was to gain
recognition as a force in the socialist front, eventually becoming leader of
its general council. Proudhon had his own following, the Proudhonists, in
attendance. They espoused Proudhon’s policies on property and credit,
along with his skepticism of authority. The Marxian faction, on the other
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hand, called for a powerful, centralized government brought on through
revolutionary action. In contrast to Proudhon, who disavowed many
confrontational tactics, they saw strikes as an absolutely vital tool in their
struggle. The two factions would split off (with another faction under the
more radical anarchist Bakunin splitting off as well.) The legacy of their two
visions has echoed through debates around socialism ever since.

Conclusion
This inquiry has sought to establish that Proudhon and Marx espoused
different understandings of socialism. Marx, on the one hand, espoused the
need for political change and, ultimately, revolution. Proudhon sought, on
the other hand, to build economic institutions that would allow workers to
develop independence from capitalist exploiters while benefitting from the
cooperative system of production. Marx’s ‘centralist’ and Proudhon’s
‘mutualist’ approaches to socialism have served as the foundation for
disputes within the socialist sphere ever since.
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